Abstract. This paper extends the core results of discrete time infinite horizon dynamic programming theory to the case of state-dependent discounting. The traditional constant-discount condition requires that the discount factor of the controller is strictly less than one. Here we replace the constant factor with a discount factor process and require, in essence, that the process is strictly less than one on average in the long run. We prove that, under this condition, the standard optimality results can be recovered, including Bellman's principle of optimality, convergence of value function iteration and convergence of policy function iteration. We also show that the condition cannot be weakened in many standard settings. The dynamic programming framework considered in the paper is general enough to contain features such as recursive preferences. Several applications are discussed.
Driven by the need to better match a variety of empirical phenomena, researchers in economics and finance now routinely adopt settings where the subjective discount rate used by agents in their models varies with the state. For example, Albuquerque et al. (2016) propose an asset pricing model in which the one-period discount factor follows an AR(1) process. They show that the resulting demand shocks help explain the equity premium puzzle. Mehra and Sah (2002) find that small fluctuations in agents' discount factors can have large effect on equity price volatility. Other studies of asset pricing with state-dependent discount factors embedded in preferences include Campbell (1986) , Albuquerque et al. (2015) and Schorfheide et al. (2018) .
State-dependent and time-varying discount rates are also common in studies of savings, income and wealth. An early example is Krusell and Smith (1998) . More recently, Krusell et al. (2009) model the discount factor process as a three state Markov chain and show how discount factor dispersion helps their heterogeneous agent model match 1 We thank Andrzej Nowak for his helpful comments. The first author gratefully acknowledges financial support from ARC grant FT160100423. Email: john.stachurski@anu.edu.au, junnan.zhang@anu.edu.au the wealth distribution. Hubmer et al. (2018) model discount factor dynamics using a discretized AR(1) process. Fagereng et al. (2019) use time-varying discount rates and portfolio adjustment frictions to explain the positive correlation between savings rates and wealth observed in Norwegian panel data.
State-dependent discounting is also found in analysis of fiscal and monetary policy. For example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) study monetary policy in the presence of zero lower bound restrictions with dynamic time preference shocks. Woodford (2011) considers the government expenditure multiplier in a similar environment. Eggertsson (2011) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) study the effect of fiscal policies at the zero lower bound on interest rates, while Nakata and Tanaka (2016) analyze the term structure of interest rates at the zero lower bound when agents have recursive preferences. In all of these models, state-dependent variation in discount rates plays a significant role.
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Among other fields, state-dependent discounting is also used regularly in studies of the business cycle and macroeconomic volatility. For example, Primiceri et al. (2006) argue that shocks to agents' rates of intertemporal substitution are a key source of macroeconomic fluctuations. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) study the shifts in the volatility of macroeconomic variables in the US and find that a large portion of consumption volatility can be attributable to the variance in discount factors.
3
In labor economics, state-dependent discounting has been adopted to help explain the excess unemployment volatility puzzle discussed in Shimer (2005) . For example, Mukoyama (2009) enhances the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with state dependent discount factors for entrepreneurs and workers, which is then shown to increase unemployment volatility. Related analysis and extensions can be found in Beraja et al. (2016) , Hall (2017) and Kehoe et al. (2018) .
The standard theory of infinite horizon dynamic programming (also called the theory of Markov decision processes; see, e.g., Bellman (1957) , Blackwell (1965) , Stokey et al. (1989) , Puterman (2014) or Bertsekas (2017) ) does not accommodate state-dependent discounting. Instead, it assumes either zero discounting (and considers long-run average optimality) or a constant and positive discount rate, which corresponds to a discount factor strictly less than one. This implies that, in the canonical setting, the Bellman operator satisfies the conditions of Banach's contraction mapping theorem.
2 Additional work from the same field with state-dependent discounting can be found in Correia et al. (2013) , Hills et al. (2016) , Hills and Nakata (2018) and Williamson (2019) .
3 Additional research in a similar vein can be found in Justiniano et al. (2010) , Justiniano et al. (2011) , Christiano et al. (2014) , Saijo (2017) , and Bhandari et al. (2013) .
This contractive property in turn provides the foundations for a powerful optimality theory.
In this paper, we reconsider the theory of infinite horizon discrete time dynamic programming when the usual constant discount factor β is replaced by a discount factor process {β t }. We then replace the traditional condition β < 1 for the constant discount case with the more general condition r(L β ) < 1, where r(L β ) is the spectral radius of an operator generated by {β t }. We show that, when this condition holds, the value function satisfies the Bellman equation, an optimal policy exists, and Bellman's principle of optimality is valid. Moreover, value function iteration converges to the value function, as it does in the standard case, and Howard's policy iteration algorithm is also convergent. We consider several applications of the theory, ranging from simple household problems to recursive preference models and optimal stopping problems. We finish with some extensions related to unbounded rewards.
The condition r(L β ) < 1 is, in several ways, the most natural generalization of the standard condition β < 1 from the constant discount case. For example, if {β t } happens to be constant at some value β, then, as we show below, r(L β ) = β, so that, in particular r(L β ) < 1 if and only if β < 1. More generally, if {β t } is iid with common meanβ, then r(L β ) =β. At the same time, if {β t } is positively correlated, then, as we show below, r(L β ) tends to increase not just with the unconditional mean of the process {β t }, but also, with the strength of correlation and the amount of volatility. This provides insight not just into the determination of r(L β ), but also into the strength of discounting as perceived by the controller across different specifications of the discount factor process.
We show that, unless one focuses on special cases, the condition r(L β ) < 1 cannot be significantly weakened. This matters for two reasons. One is that the theoretical results contained here have some permanent relevance. The other is that the weakness of the condition allows us to treat topical applications in the quantitative research literature. For example, the condition r(L β ) < 1 does not rule out the possibility that β t 1 with positive probability. This matters because, in some of the new Keynesian literature, the discount factor is allowed to temporarily attain or exceed one so that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rates binds (see, e.g., Christiano et al. (2011 ), Eggertsson (2011 or Correia et al. (2013) ). Other studies use an AR(1) specification for the log of the discount factor process (or the process itself), which allows the discount factor to become arbitrarily large. (2011), Christiano et al. (2014) , Saijo (2017) or Schorfheide et al. (2018) . Although quantitative
In terms of computation, when {β t } takes only finitely many values, r(L β ) reduces to the spectral radius of a matrix, and hence can be obtained by standard algorithms from numerical linear algebra. If {β t } is a continuous process, then the same ideas can be applied after discretization. One such application is considered in the paper.
This paper is not the first to reconsider dynamic programming problems when the discount factor is allowed to vary over time. For example, Karni and Zilcha (2000) study the saving behavior of agents with random discount factors in a steady-state competitive equilibrium. Cao (2018) proves the existence of sequential and recursive competitive equilibria in incomplete markets with aggregate shocks in which agents also have state-dependent discount factors. In the mathematics literature, Wei and Guo (2011 ), Carmon and Shwartz (2009 ), Minjárez-Sosa (2015 , Ilhuicatzi-Roldán et al. (2017) and González-Sánchez et al. (2019) all address various issues in dynamic programming with state-dependent discounting However, these papers assume that the discount factor process in the dynamic program is bounded above by some constant b such that b < 1. This is too strict for a range of valuable applications, as discussed above.
One paper from the mathematics literature that admits state-dependent discounting under weak conditions is Schäl (1975) . He obtains some results on optimality, including existence of optimal policies and Bellman's principle of optimality, under a condition that bounds the tail of expected discounted rewards. Although this condition is general, it directly assumes that expected discounted rewards are finite under any Markov policy, and hence restricts all primitives in the dynamic program simultaneously. This makes the condition difficult to test it in applications. (No applications are provided in the paper.) In contrast, our condition is designed to be weak enough to include all of the economic applications listed above, while at the same time providing a simple, practical condition that can be tested in applications. Another advantage of our approach is that it allows for recursive preferences and unbounded rewards.
Our work is also related to several recent contributions in the literature on optimal savings that allow for relatively general discount factor processes. For example, an innovative study by Toda (2018) investigates an income fluctuation problem in which the agent has CRRA utility and obtains a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution to the optimal saving problem with state-dependent discount implementations imply a finite upper bound, cases where β t 1 with positive probability at the benchmark parameterizations still occur. For example, Hills et al. (2016) assume that β t = ρβ t−1 + (1 − ρ)µ + µ t , where µ = 0.996, ρ = 0.8, and σ = 0.0024. In their discretization, the largest value for β is 1.006 (see p. 41).
factors. The CRRA restriction is relaxed in Ma et al. (2019) . However, their techniques are based around methods for household problems that have no natural analog in the general theory of dynamic programming considered here. Neither of these papers attempts to provide a general theory of dynamic optimality when the discount rate can vary.
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As one extension of our results, we consider the case where rewards can be unboundeda situation arises frequently in economics but introduces technical problems even in the standard case. One line of argument draws on Alvarez and Stokey (1998) , which treats homogeneous dynamic programs when the discount factor is constant. A second line of argument extends the local contraction method of Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero (2003) , Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010), Matkowski and Nowak (2011) , and Jaśkiewicz and Nowak (2011) to the case of state-dependent discounting.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 sets out the model. Section 2 provides our main results. Section 3 reviews our key assumption. Section 4 gives applications, Section 5 discusses two extensions and Section 6 concludes.
A Dynamic Program
We begin with an extension of the abstract dynamic framework of Bertsekas (2013) , which can handle non-separable features such as recursive preferences. Throughout, if Y is any metric space, then bmY and bcY denote the bounded (Borel) measurable and bounded continuous functions from Y to R respectively. 1.1. Framework. The state of the world consists of a pair (x, z), where x represents a set of endogenous variables, affected by the actions of an agent (the controller), and z is an exogenous state. These variables take values in metric spaces X and Z respectively. For convenience, we set S := X × Z. The agent responds to the current state by taking action a from an action space A, which is a separable metric space. The choice a when facing state (x, z), is restricted to Γ(x, z) ⊂ A, where Γ is the feasible correspondence. Let gr Γ be all ((x, z), a) in S × A such that a is in Γ(x, z). In other words, gr Γ is all feasible state-action pairs.
The exogenous state evolves according to a Markov transition kernel Q, so that Q(z, B) represents the probability of transitioning to Borel set B ⊂ Z next period, given current exogenous state z. Throughout, E z represents expectation conditional on Z 0 = z.
5 Also relevant are Higashi et al. (2009) , which provides an axiomatic foundation for preferences with random discounting. Other work along this line includes Krishna and Sadowski (2014) and Higashi et al. (2017) .
We combine the remaining elements of the dynamic programming problem into a single continuation aggregator H, with the understanding that H(x, z, a, v) is the maximal value that can be obtained from the present time under the continuation value function v, given current state (x, z) and current action a. Thus, Bellman's equation takes the form
We take V to be a nonempty set of candidate value functions, each one of which is required to be real-valued, measurable and defined on S. The continuation aggregator H maps each (x, z, a, v) in gr Γ × V into a real number.
A dynamic program D is a tuple (X, Z, A, Γ, H, V) with the structure imposed above.
The next example illustrates in the context of a one-sector growth model. Example 1.1. Consider the one-sector stochastic optimal growth model as found in, say, Stokey et al. (1989) , except that the discount rate is state-dependent. An agent solves
subject to
where β is a nonnegative function, {Z t } is a discrete time Markov process with transition kernel Q, u is a oneperiod return function and f is a production function. When interpreting (2), we adopt the convention that −1 i=0 β i = 1, and same convention is used for products over all other sequences.
The Bellman equation is
This problem can be mapped to our framework by taking capital as the endogenous state, z as the exogenous state and consumption as the action. The endogenous state space X and the action space A can be set to R + , while Z to be some arbitrary metric space. The feasible correspondence Γ(x, z) is all a such that 0 a f (x, z), and
While the same shock process {Z t } affects both production and the discount rate under this formulation, there is no loss of generality because the shock space Z is arbitrary and hence can support multiple independent processes.
1.2. Feasibility and Optimality. Given a dynamic program D, let Σ be the set of feasible policies, defined as all Borel measurable maps σ from S to A such that σ(x, z) ∈ Γ(x, z) for each (x, z) in S. Given each such σ, let T σ be the operator on V given by
Define the Bellman operator T on V by
Given v 0 in V and σ in Σ, we can interpret v n,σ (x, z) := (T n σ v 0 )(x, z) as the lifetime payoff of an agent who starts at state (x, z), follows policy σ for n periods and uses v 0 to evaluate the terminal state. The σ-value function for an infinite-horizon problem is defined here as
The definition requires that this limit exists and is independent of v 0 . Below we impose conditions such that this is always the case.
We define the value function corresponding to our dynamic program by
at each (x, z) in S. Existence of the value function requires that v σ is well defined for each σ ∈ Σ, as well as some upper bound on the value that can be obtained from each policy. When the value function does exist, as it will in our setting, a policy σ * ∈ Σ is called optimal whenever it attains the supremum in (7), which is to say that
at each (x, z) in S.
1.3. Regularity. To present sharp optimality results, it is useful to add some degree of regularity via continuity and compactness. To this end, we define a dynamic program D to be regular if (a) the set of candidate value functions V equals bmS, (b) the correspondence Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, and (c) the map (x, z, a) → H(x, z, a, v) is measurable for all v ∈ bmS, continuous for all v ∈ bcS, and bounded for at least one v ∈ bcS.
Many standard cases from the literature are regular.
Example 1.2. The optimal growth model in Example 1.1 is regular if u and f satisfy standard conditions, such as those in Section 5.1 of Stokey et al. (1989) , Z is compact, β is a continuous function and Q is Feller.
6 Example 1.3. All dynamic programs with finite state and action spaces are regular, since conditions (a)-(c) are automatically satisfied when we endow both spaces with the discrete topology.
(Although we obtain some fundamental dynamic programming results without regularity, this discussion is left to extensions and the appendix.)
1.4. Key Assumptions. Consider the following restrictions for the dynamic program D, the first of which is standard.
The importance of Assumption 1.1 is well known (see, e.g., Bertsekas, 2013, Chapter 2). It clearly holds in (4) when the discount factor function β is nonnegative. In general, Assumption 1.1 is a mild condition that holds for all problems we consider.
The next assumption is new and central to what follows.
Assumption 1.2 (Long-Run Contractivity). There exists a positive function β in bmZ such that, for all v, w ∈ V, we have
for all (x, z) ∈ S and a ∈ Γ(x, z). Moreover, β is such that the spectral radius r(L β ) of the linear operator
satisfies r(L β ) < 1.
Here bmZ is the set of all bounded measurable functions from Z to R, paired with the supremum norm. As usual, the spectral radius of a linear operator L from bmZ to itself is defined by r(L) = lim n→∞ L n 1/n , where · is the operator norm. 7 The spectral radius condition from Assumption 1.2 is shown in the appendix to be equivalent to
where {Z t } is a Markov process generated by Q. In our applications, β t = β(Z t ) will have the interpretation of the time t value of the discount factor process.
Assumption 1.2 is the key condition of the paper. It is a generalization of the usual (see, e.g., Bertsekas, 2013, Chapter 2) discounting condition
for some constant b < 1. This is easy to see because, if a b satisfying (12) exists, then we can set β ≡ b as the function in Assumption 1.2. Evidently (9) then holds. In addition (11) is immediate, so the spectral radius condition r(L β ) < 1 also holds.
An extended discussion of the spectral radius condition r(L β ) < 1, including how to test it and how to understand its implications, is provided in Section 3.
Results
We can now state our main results. We provide a fundamental optimality result, as well as a discussion of two standard algorithms: value function iteration and policy function iteration. a. T σ is eventually contracting on bmS and T is eventually contracting on bcS.
b. For each feasible policy σ, the lifetime value v σ is a well defined element of bmS.
c. The value function v * is well defined, bounded and continuous. Moreover, the unique fixed point of T in bcS is v * .
7 This is the Gelfand representation of the spectral radius. See, for example, Krasnoselskii et al. (1972) , Ch. 1. 8 More precisely, a self-map M on metric space (Y, ρ) is called eventually contracting if there exists an n in N and a λ < 1 such that ρ(M n y, M n y ) λρ(y, y ) for all y, y in Y .
d. At least one optimal policy exists.
e. A policy σ ∈ Σ is optimal if and only if it satisfies
This theorem extends the core results of dynamic programming theory to the case of state-dependent discounting. In particular, the value function satisfies the Bellman equation, an optimal policy exists, and Bellman's principle of optimality is valid (i.e., part (e) holds). Iteration with the Bellman operator leads to the value function, so that we have both existence of an optimal policy and a means to compute it.
Relative to the results that can be obtained under the standard one-step contraction condition in (12), as found for instance in Chapter 2 of Bertsekas (2013) , the only significant weakening of the main findings is that T and T σ are eventually contracting, rather than always contracting in one step. This is due to the fact that values of the discount factor greater than one are admitted, for reasons discussed in the introduction. Only in the long run are we guaranteed of contraction.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is deferred to the appendix. In the proof, we only adopt regularity when necessary, so the results contained in the appendix also provide information on what can be said if the regularity condition is dropped. Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to optimality over stationary policies-that is, the agent chooses the same policy in every period, because stationary policies dominate nonstationary ones. The proof is similar to the standard case and hence omitted. See, for example, Chapter 2 of Bertsekas (2013).
2.2. Policy Iteration. Howard's policy iteration algorithm generates a sequence of feasible policies in the following way. Choose any σ 0 ∈ Σ and define σ k for k ∈ N by
The next proposition shows that, under the conditions adopted in Theorem 2.1, the values of the policy sequence generated by Howard's policy iteration algorithm converge to the maximum possible.
Theorem 2.2. If the conditions of Theorem 2.1 hold and the policy sequence {σ k } satisfies (14), then v σ k → v * uniformly as k → ∞.
Understanding the Long-Run Contractivity Condition
Assumption 1.2 is specifically designed to handle models with state-dependent discount factors. Before moving on to such applications, we examine Assumption 1.2 in greater depth. In particular, we wish to know the implications of and restrictions imposed by the spectral radius condition r(L β ) < 1 on a given discount factor process {β t }.
3.1. The Finite State Case. One common sub-case in terms of applications is the setting where the exogenous state space Z is finite. In this case, the transition probability kernel Q can be represented as a Markov matrix of values Q ij , giving the one-step probability of transitioning from z i to z j . As can be seen from its definition in (10), the linear operator L β can be represented as the matrix
Here β i := β(z i ) and N is the number of elements in Z. The spectral radius of L β can be computed using standard routines, first by computing the eigenvalues of the matrix and next by taking the maximum in modulus.
For continuous state exogenous processes, the same procedure can be implemented numerically after discretizing the process. The next section discusses such a case.
3.2. A Representative Discount Factor Process. It is often assumed that the discount factor process obeys an AR(1) specification such as
where −1 < ρ < 1, σ is positive and { t } is iid and standard normal (see, e.g., Hills et al. (2016) , Hubmer et al. (2018) or Schorfheide et al. (2018) ). While this approach is problematic in its original form, since the discount process can be negative and, at the same time, is unbounded above, most quantitative analyses circumvent these issues by discretization. In this section we do the same and then investigate the factors that determine the size of r(L β ). Discretization is carried out using the Rouwenhorst method, which is well suited to highly correlated Gaussian AR(1) processes.
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Our benchmark parameterization is µ = 0.985, ρ = 0.99, and σ β = 0.01, where σ β is the unconditional standard deviation of β t computed by σ β = σ e /( 1 − ρ 2 ). At this parameterization, the method for finite exogenous state problems described above yields 9 See, Kopecky and Suen (2010) for an exposition of the method and some of its properties. We set the number of states N = 50, which as Kopecky and Suen (2010) show, is accurate enough for most applications. Figure 1 plots values of r(L β ) as a function of ρ and σ β , represented by contour lines, while µ is held constant at its benchmark value. The main message of the figure is that larger volatility and larger persistence both lead to a higher spectral radius for L β , and the effect of increasing ρ becomes large when σ β is large.
What is the intuition behind this result? To gain some understanding, consider a generic stationary discount factor process {β t } and let µ := Eβ 0 be the common mean. Suppose that the process exhibits positive autocorrelation. Then, for any t, the variates β t and β t+1 are positively correlated, which is equivalent to the statement that (Eβ t β t+1 ) 1/2 µ. For this bivariate case, then, positive correlation pushes the expected geometric time series average above the stationary mean. Moreover, the inequality is strict precisely when the joint distribution is not degenerate.
The situation is even clearer when we focus on the AR(1) model (16). In this case, we have (
µ. The key message is the same: positive correlation and positive volatility push the expected geometric time series average above the stationary mean. The impact increases with both ρ and σ β , and the two effects reinforce each other.
The connection between this and r(L β ) is that, as we show in (26) of the appendix, the spectral radius of L β is in fact equal to an asymptotic long-run version of this geometric average. Putting the pieces together, we can see why increased positive correlation and increased volatility in the discount factor process tend to drive up r(L β ) relative to the stationary mean of β t , as seen in Figure 1. 3.3. Necessity of the Spectral Radius Condition. Consider a standard Markov decision process (as in, say, Blackwell (1965) ), where a controller seeks to maximize an expression of the form E t 0 β t r t . Here β > 0 is a constant discount factor and {r t } is a bounded sequence of rewards. In this setting, the condition β < 1 cannot be relaxed without imposing specific conditions on rewards. For example, if there are constants 0 < a b such that a r t b for all t, then we clearly have 
The condition r(L β ) < 1 has this same distinction once we replace the constant discount factor β with a discount factor process {β t }, as long as we are prepared to impose some regularity conditions. The next proposition gives one such result. In stating it, the process {β t } and the operator L β are as defined in Assumption 1.2, while {r t } is as just described.
Proposition 3.1. If the exogenous state space Z is compact and β is continuous, then
Applications
In this section we turn to applications of Theorems 2.1-2.2.
4.1. One-Sector Stochastic Optimal Growth. Recall the stochastic optimal growth model with state-dependent discounting from Example 1.1. If u and f satisfy standard conditions, as in, say, Section 5.1 of Stokey et al. (1989) , then the dynamic program is regular. The monotonicity condition in Assumption 1.1 certainly holds. Regarding Assumption 1.2, since H is given by (4), we have
10 The equivalence in (17) is easy to see because, by the Monotone Convergence Theorem, we have E t 0 β t r t = t 0 β t Er t and, moreover, 0 < a Er t b.
Here the first inequality is by the triangle inequality for integrals and the second is obvious. Hence, if the process β t satisfies r(L β ) < 1, then Assumption 1.2 also holds, and so do the conclusions of Theorems 2.1-2.2. Conditions under which r(L β ) < 1 holds were discussed in Section 3.
4.2. Job Search. Our framework is also able to deal with optimal stopping problems with proper definitions of the primitives. In this section, we demonstrate this using an elementary job search problem in McCall (1970) except that the agent has statedependent discount factors. The basic structure considered here can be modified to deal with more complicated optimal stopping problems, such as Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Robin (2011) .
An unemployed worker searching for a job is given a wage offer every period. He can accept the offer and receive this wage every period forever, or he can choose to receive an unemployment compensation c and wait for another offer next period. Uncertainty is driven by a Markov process on a metric space Z with stochastic kernel Q. The wage offer is given by a function w : Z → R + . Since the discount factors are state dependent, the lifetime utility of accepting an offer at state z is K(z)w(z) where
The Bellman equation is thus
We can translate this problem to our framework by letting S = Z, A = {0, 1}, Γ ≡ A, and
is the associated dynamic program with V = bmS. Note that in this setting, the state space X is redundant. In particular, the Bellman operator defined from D is
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. If (i) w and β are bounded and continuous, (ii) r(L β ) < 1 where L β is defined in (10), and (iii) Q has the Feller property, then D is regular and Assumptions 1.1-1.2 hold. In particular, the conclusions of Theorems 2.1-2.2 are valid.
4.3.
A Household Problem with Taxation. Consider the household problem in Hills and Nakata (2018) , where u : R + → R is one-period utility and the discount factor at time t is β t . The agent chooses consumption {C t } and risk-free asset {B t } to solve
subject to the constraint
The interest rate R t , price level P t , and lump-sum tax T t are taken as given by the agent. We suppose that R t = R(Z t ), P t = P (Z t ), T t = T (Z t ) and β t = β(Z t ), where {Z t } is a Markov process on metric space Z with transition kernel Q and R, P, T and β are Borel measurable functions. Let X = A be a compact subset of R + and assume that R and P are bounded below away from zero. Define
where
corresponds to consumption given current-period asset x, next-period asset a, and shock z. Define the feasible correspondence by
Let S = X × Z and let D = (X, Z, A, Γ, H, V) be the associated dynamic program, where the class of candidate value functions V is equal to bmS. Proposition 4.2. If (i) R, P , T , and β are bounded and continuous, (ii) u is continuous, (iii) r(L β ) < 1 where L β is defined in (10), and (iv) Q has the Feller property, then D is regular and Assumptions 1.1-1.2 hold. In particular, the conclusions of Theorems 2.1-2.2 are valid.
Recursive Preferences.
Consider the Epstein-Zin utility with discount factor shocks studied in Albuquerque et al. (2016) . The lifetime utility 11 of the agent at time t has a recursive formulation:
Uncertainty in the economy is driven by a sequence of Markovian shocks {Z t } on Z with stochastic kernel Q. There is a single risky asset in unit supply with price p(z) and dividend d(z) given shock z. In each period, the agent maximizes lifetime utility subject to budget constraint
where X t is asset holding of the agent at time t. Given d and p, we seek a solution to the Bellman equation
where F (x, z, a) = d(z)x+p(z)(x−a) corresponds to consumption given current-period asset x, next-period asset a, and shock z, and
is the constraint 12 on asset holding. We consider the case where ρ < γ < 1 so that utilities are positive and work onṽ = v 1−γ instead. Sinceṽ = v 1−γ is a strictly increasing transformation, for positive value functions the two formulations are equivalent.
To study this problem in our theoretical framework, let X = A = R + and define (20) can be written asṽ = Tṽ where T is defined in (6). Let S = X × Z and V = bmS. This problem can be formulated as a
11 We use an alternative formulation of the recursive utility in their paper; see footnote 9 in Albuquerque et al. (2016) . 12 Asset holding cannot exceed one due to its fixed supply. 
Extensions
In this section, we let X = A, and consider aggregators of the form
where u is continuous but not necessarily bounded. All the other primitives are as defined in Section 1.1. Since value functions are not in bmS in this case, the associated dynamic program D is no longer regular and most results in Section 2 do not apply.
We shall discuss two approaches that are common in dealing with dynamic programming with unbounded rewards. The first one is in the spirit of Stokey et al. (1989, Section 9. 3) and Alvarez and Stokey (1998) that treat homogeneous programs. The second one uses a local contraction method. Each approach considers a different space for candidate value functions and establishes contraction of the Bellman operator on the new space when β is constant. This section aims to show that the Bellman operator is eventually contracting in the face of state-dependent discount factors as long as proper spectral conditions similar to Assumption 1.2 are satisfied.
Homogeneous Functions.
Consider dynamic programming problems with return functions that are homogeneous of degree θ ∈ (0, 1] and feasible correspondences that are homogeneous of degree one. In particular, we have the following standard assumption.
Assumption 5.1. The feasible correspondence Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, and for any (x, z) ∈ S,
The return function u is continuous, u(·, z, ·) is homogeneous of degree θ, and there exists B > 0 such that for any (x, z) ∈ S |u(x, z, a)| B( x + a ), ∀a ∈ Γ(x, z).
The next assumption is a generalization of the standard growth restriction to problems with state-dependent discount factors. Note that if both β and α are constant, r(L α ) < 1 regresses to the familiar condition α θ β < 1.
Assumption 5.2. There exists a bounded measurable function α :
The operator L α : bmZ → bmZ defined by
satisfies that r(L α ) < 1.
Let (H(S; θ), · ) be the space of bounded continuous functions that are homogeneous of degree θ with norm defined by
Then H(S; θ) is a Banach space (Stokey et al., 1989) . We have the following result.
Proposition 5.1. Let V = H(S; θ) and D = (X, Z, A, Γ, H, V) be the associated dynamic program. Under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, the lifetime value v σ (x 0 , z 0 ) is well defined and finite for any initial state (x 0 , z 0 ) and feasible policy σ, the value function v * is a unique fixed point of T on V, T n v → v * for all v ∈ V, there exists an optimal stationary policy, and the principle of optimality holds.
Example 5.1. Consider the household saving problem in Toda (2018) without restricting the shock space to be finite. Instead, we assume that the shocks are Markovian with stochastic kernel Q on an arbitrary metric space Z. The asset return R(z) and discount function β(z) are bounded continuous functions of the shocks. The utility function is u(c) = c 1−γ /(1 − γ) and we assume that γ ∈ (0, 1). The budget constraint is X t+1 = R(Z t )(X t − C t ) where X t is the beginning-of-period wealth, C t is consumption, and Z t is shock at time t. The Bellman equation is thus
Then Assumption 5.1 is satisfied and so is Assumption
This is equivalent to the spectral radius condition 13 in Proposition 1 of Toda (2018) if Z is finite.
13 The condition in Toda (2018) is r(DP ) < 1 where
) and P is the transition matrix. Also see discussion in Section 3.2.
5.2. Local Contractions. Next we take a local contraction approach to dynamic programs with state dependent discounting and unbounded rewards. We follow the methods pioneered in Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero (2003), Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010) and Matkowski and Nowak (2011) for the constant discount case. Let C(S) be the space of continuous functions on S. Assume that Z is compact and X = j Int(K j ) where {K j } is a sequence of strictly increasing and compact subsets of X. Define · j by
Let c > 1 and {m j } be an unbounded sequence of increasing positive real numbers. Let C m (S) be the space of all f ∈ C(S) such that
Then (C m (S), · ) is a Banach space (Matkowski and Nowak, 2011 ).
Assumption 5.3. Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, β is bounded, u is continuous, and Q is Feller.
Assumption 5.4. Γ(x, z) ⊂ K j for all x ∈ K j , all z ∈ Z, and all j ∈ N, and r(L β ) < 1 where L β is defined in (10).
Proposition 5.2. Let V = C m (S) and D = (X, Z, A, Γ, H, V) be the associated dynamic program. Under Assumptions 5.3 and 5.4, the lifetime value v σ (x 0 , z 0 ) is well defined and finite for any initial state (x 0 , z 0 ) and feasible policy σ, there exists an increasing unbounded sequence {m j } such that the value function v * is the unique fixed point of
there exists an optimal stationary policy, and the principle of optimality holds.
Example 5.2. Consider Example 1.1 14 with production function f (k, z) = zf (k), discount function β(z), and utility u any (unbounded) continuous function. Let X = A = R + and Z be a compact subset of R + . Suppose f is positive, strictly concave in k, and lim k→∞ f (k) = 0. Then we can find a sequence 15 {K j } of strictly increasing and compact sets covering X such that Γ(k, z) ⊂ K j for all x ∈ K j . Furthermore, if β satisfies r(L β ) < 1, then Proposition 5.2 can be applied.
Conclusion
We provide a simple spectral radius condition under which standard infinite horizon dynamic programs with state-dependent discount rates are well defined and well behaved. In particular, under the stated condition, the value function satisfies the Bellman equation, an optimal policy exists and Bellman's principle of optimality is valid. Thus, the spectral radius condition we state is the natural analog of the condition β < 1 in the traditional setting, where the discount factor β is not state-dependent. Several applications were provided, including those with both bounded and unbounded rewards.
Appendix A. Remaining Proofs
In what follows, we consider the dynamic program described in Section 1.1. We will at times make use of the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. The function β yields r(L β ) < 1 if and only if (11) holds.
Proof. Let 1 ≡ 1 on Z. For each z ∈ Z and n ∈ N, an inductive argument gives
Thus, condition (11) can be written as L n β 1 < 1 for some n ∈ N. Applying Theorem 9.1 of Krasnoselskii et al. (1972) , since (i) L β is a positive linear operator on bmZ, (ii) the positive cone in this set is solid and normal under the pointwise partial order
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, and (iii) 1 lies interior to the positive cone in bmZ, we have
where the second equality is due to (25), nonnegativity of β and the definition of the supremum norm. It follows immediately that r(L β ) < 1 implies the condition in (11).
To see that the converse is true, suppose there exists n ∈ N such that (11) holds. Then it follows from the Markov property that
A.1. Proofs for Section 2.
A.1.1. General Results. We begin with a set of dynamic programming results in an abstract setting that does not impose regularity. Recall from Section 1.1 that V is a subset of bmS.
Assumption A.1. V is a complete metric space under the sup metric and the operator T σ is a self map on V for all σ ∈ Σ. There exists a closed subsetV ⊂ V equipped with the sup metric on which T is a self map.
Theorem A.2. Under Assumptions 1.2 and A.1, there exists n ∈ N such that T σ and T are n-step contraction mappings on V andV, respectively.
Proof. In view of T σ defined in (5), Assumption 1.2 implies that for any v, w ∈ V and
Iterating on the above inequality gives
It follows from an inductive argument that
Taking the supremum gives
Since Lemma A.1 implies that (11) holds for some n, T σ is an n-step contraction on V.
As to the Bellman operator T defined in (6), we have
for all v, w ∈V. It then follows from Assumption 1.2 that
A similar inductive argument shows that
In light of Lemma A.1, T is an n-step contraction onV.
We have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary A.3. If v 0 ∈ V, the σ-value function v σ is the unique fixed point of T σ in V. The Bellman operator T has a unique fixed pointv inV. Moreover, T n σ v → v σ for all v ∈ V and T n w →v for all w ∈V.
Proof. By Assumption A.1 and a generalized Contraction Mapping Theorem (see, e.g., Cheney, 2013, Section 4.2), T σ and T are globally stable on V andV respectively. Hence, if v 0 ∈ V, v σ is the unique fixed point of T σ in V by definition and T n σ v → v σ for all v ∈ V. Similarly, T has a unique fixed pointv ∈V and T n v → v σ for all v ∈V.
Corollary A.3 establishes the global stability of T and T σ . Moreover, it shows that the unique fixed point of T σ is the σ-value function, the lifetime utility to be optimized. They are both crucial in deriving our next optimality result.
Theorem A.4. Under Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and A.1, if v 0 ∈ V and there exists some σ ∈ Σ such that T σv = Tv, thenv = v * and σ is the optimal policy.
Proof. First note thatv(x, z) = (Tv)(x, z) (T σv )(x, z) for all x ∈ X, z ∈ Z, and σ ∈ Σ by definition. Iterating T σ on both sides and using Assumption 1.1, we havē
and σ ∈ Σ. Taking the supremum over Σ givesv v * .
For the other direction, since there exists σ ∈ Σ such that T σv = Tv, we have T σv =v. Becausev ∈V ⊂ V and T σ has a unique fixed point in V,v = v σ . By the definition of v * , we have v * v σ =v. Therefore, v σ = v * =v. By definition, σ is the optimal policy.
A.1.2. Regular Dynamic Programs. Next we derive some nice properties for regular dynamic programs so that the assumptions of Theorem A.4 can be easily verified.
Proposition A.5. If D is a regular dynamic program (see Section 1.3) and Assumption 1.2 holds, then Assumption A.1 holds withV = bcS and for all v ∈V there exists
Proof of Proposition A.5. Since S is a metric space, V = bmS andV = bcS are complete metric spaces under the sup metric.
By definition, for all σ ∈ Σ and all v ∈ V we have
The regularity of the dynamic program together with the measurability of all σ ∈ Σ implies that T σ v is measurable. Since there exists v ∈ bcS such that (x, z, a) → H(x, z, a, x) is bounded, we have
where the last two inequalities follow from assumption 1.2. Hence, T σ is a self map on V for all σ ∈ Σ.
To show that T is a self map onV , we use the maximum theorem. Since Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, and (x, z, a) → H(x, z, a, v) is continuous for all v ∈V, T v defined by
is continuous. The boundedness of T v can be derived similarly as above.
Finally, to show the last part, we need the maximizer correspondence to admit a measurable selection. The fact that (x, z, a) → H(x, z, a, v) is continuous for all v ∈V, A is a separable metric space, and Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued ensures that we can apply the measurable maximum theorem (see, for example, Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) ). Hence, for all v ∈V there exists a measurable maximizer σ such that T σ v = T v. The purpose of the assumptions for Proposition A.6 is to ensure that the policies generated by the algorithm are well defined. We can impose further convexity condition on Γ and concavity condition on H to make the assumptions hold. See Stokey et al. (1989, Chapter 9) for examples of such conditions in more specific models.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Since D is regular and satisfies Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, it follows from Proposition A.5 that Assumption A.1 holds. Then the rest follows from applying Proposition A.6.
A.2. Proofs for Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose first that r(L β ) < 1. Then, since r t b, we have (Here z 0 is the initial condition of the state process {Z t }.) Since e is everywhere positive and r(L β ) 1, the sum diverges to infinity.
A.3. Proofs for Section 4. We first prove a useful lemma.
Lemma A.7. If r(L β ) < 1 where L β is defined in (10), then we have
Proof. Since r(L β ) < 1, Lemma A.1 yields an N ∈ N such that sup z∈Z E z n−1 t=0 β(Z t ) < 1 for all n N . Let Proof of Proposition 4.2. It is obvious that Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Next we check that D is regular so that we can apply Theorem 2.1. Since R, T , and P are bounded and continuous, Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued. Since β and u(F (·)) is bounded and continuous, and Q has the Feller property, (c) of the regularity requirements is also satisfied (Stokey et al., 1989, Lemma 12.14) . The rest follows from Theorem 2.1 and 2.2.
Since r(L β ) < 1, T is a 0-local contraction 17 by Lemma A.1. Then it follows from Proposition 1 of Matkowski and Nowak (2011) that T has a unique fixed pointv in C m (S). It can be proved in the same way that T σ is also a 0-local contraction and hence v σ is well defined and finite for any initial state. Since we can find σ such that T σv = Tv by the measurable maximum theorem, the optimality results follow from a similar argument to the proofs of Theorem A.4.
